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M.A. Essay 
Sites of Interpretation in the “Gaza” of Johannes de Alta Silva 
1. Introduction  
Similar to other medieval texts like the Arabian Nights, Boccaccio’s Decameron, and Chaucer’s 
Canterbury Tales, The Seven Sages is a classic frame tale in which a larger narrative framework 
provides the setting for a series of stories told within it. This essay will consider this frame 
narrative as the key element in our understanding of The Seven Sages. While it is common for 
frame tales to stage the telling of stories, The Seven Sages is unique in the extent to which it 
dramatizes the process of those stories’ interpretation. To support this assessment, I consider the 
sites of interpretation located at the level of the story (i.e., within the tales told by the sages), at 
the level of the frame narrative, and at the level of the reader. In doing so, my analysis will 
illuminate how the structure of The Seven Sages creates its elusive meaning. Further, given the 
place of The Seven Sages within the larger medieval tradition of didactic literature, I pose the 
questions which led me to this project: what defines the didacticism of The Seven Sages, and 
what does this say about the nature of didacticism more generally?  
To focus my inquiry, I turn to a version of The Seven Sages that scholars have tended to 
treat as an outlier from the main western tradition: the Dolopathos of Johannes de Alta Silva, a 
Cistercian monk at the monastery of Haute Seille (Alta Silva). Alta Silva composed this, his only 
known work, between 1184 and 1212, presumably working from a collection of oral and written 
sources (Gilleland xvii). Transplanted from Rome to Sicily, the frame narrative of the 
Dolopathos takes place during the reign of Augustus Caesar and is named for the king in the 
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frame narrative: one who suffers treachery or grief (the hybrid Latin-Greek etymology of 
“Dolopathos”) (Gilleland v). The young prince in this version is named Lucinius, while the 
queen, Lucinius’s stepmother, remains unnamed. As in other versions of The Seven Sages, the 
queen attempts to seduce her stepson, Lucinius. Rebuffed, she accuses him of rape, after which 
Lucinius is sentenced to death by his father, Dolopathos. Each day, after the young prince has 
been led out for execution, with the prince sworn to silence and thus unable to defend himself, 
one of the seven sages tells a story to persuade Dolopathos to stay the execution of his son until 
the following day. This continues for seven days, until on the eighth day the prince’s tutor 
exonerates the prince, after which the queen is executed.  
While much Seven Sages scholarship has been devoted to philological considerations of 
origins and authorship, I use a narratological approach to interrogate questions of meaning and 
design. I draw especially upon the work of John Jaunzems, who argued that the unity of The 
Seven Sages came not from a single guiding theme in the content of its stories but from the 
interrelationships between the interpolated tales (Jaunzems 47-49). Granting Jaunzems’s 
perception of unity, I work to deepen Jaunzems’s analysis by considering the three sites of 
interpretation outlined above to show how The Seven Sages provides a model for our own 
process of reading and interpretation. Additionally, I draw upon concepts from narratological and 
reader-response theory, particularly Gérard Genette’s presentation of “narrative levels,” Mikhail 
Bakhtin’s conception of the “dialogic,” Gerald Prince’s definition of the “narratee,” Wolfgang 
Iser’s phenomenological approach to reader-response, and the influence of medieval allegory. 
The key to my analysis is to limit my discussion not just to the Dolopathos, but even 
further to a single story within this collection known in Seven Sages criticism as “Gaza.” This 
essay will thereby demonstrate a kind of close reading that replicates the acts of interpretation 
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performed within the text to theorize the relationship between text and reader. To do so, I will 
consider the three sites of interpretation (at the levels of story, frame narrative, and reader) as 
distinct spaces within which this interpretation unfolds. My analysis thus presents a shared 
framework to that theorized by Genette in his discussion of diegetic and metadiegetic narratives 
(Genette 227-37), designated throughout this essay as the level of the frame narrative (diegetic) 
and the level of the story (metadiegetic). Identifying himself as the historian of these events, Alta 
Silva’s presentation of himself within the text operates at Genette’s extradiegetic level. I argue 
that this level serves not as a major site of interpretation, but primarily as the most explicit means 
by which Alta Silva directs the reader how to read. Given that I am concerned predominantly 
with sites of interpretation and not only with the structure and function of narrative, this essay 
also adds a fourth category not present in Genette’s narrative levels: the reader, within whose 
mind the various levels of narrative and interpretation converge and align.   
Although this essay cannot perform an exhaustive reading of the entire Seven Sages 
tradition, aspects of that tradition will be referenced to bring to light features of the Dolopathos 
that support my argument. Further, since I intend for my argument here to offer clarity about that 
tradition, I consider the relationship between my narrower focus on a single story and the larger 
context of The Seven Sages as essentially hermeneutic.  
 
2. “Gaza” and the Three Sites of Interpretation 
The story known as “Gaza” (Latin for “treasure”) exemplifies the three sites of interpretation I 
have designated as occurring at the levels of story, frame narrative, and reader. Versions of this 
story appeared in three of the earliest European versions of The Seven Sages, which makes it one 
of four stories shared between the two major western branches of the tradition. In addition to its 
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utility for this analysis, it therefore serves as a suitable case study for forming an understanding 
of the early thrust of the tradition in the West.  
 
Level 1: Story  
Described by Speer as “a ripping good yarn” along the lines of a Horatio-Alger tale of rags to 
riches, “Gaza” had its first known written appearance in Herodotus’s fifth century BCE account 
of the history of Egypt (allegedly reported to him by the priests at Memphis). Written and 
rewritten for two and a half millennia, folklorists believe Herodotus’s version was merely an 
abridgement of an already well-known tale (Speer 125-27).  
In the Dolopathos, “Gaza” is told by a sage who wishes to persuade Dolopathos to delay 
the execution of his son, Lucinius. Alta Silva’s version features a knight who retires from service 
as guardian of the king’s treasury. The knight lavishes his wealth on his son, who spends it all on 
an extravagant lifestyle. Fallen into indigence, knight and son rob the treasury. The king plans to 
trap the thieves upon their return by placing a vat of pitch beneath their entrance to the tower. 
When father and son return, the knight enters unawares and falls into the trap laid for him by the 
king. The knight commands his son to cut off his head, lest his body be identified, and his family 
be disgraced. After the son avoids a series of the king’s attempts to discover him, the king 
abandons his search. 
It is first important to notice the role that thievery plays in the story, which provides the 
setting for its broader philosophical meditations. Not only about theft, “Gaza” also becomes a 
story about detection, which is always about uncovering some kind of truth. Alta Silva’s 
selection of a story that incorporates the necessity of interpretation within the plot therefore 
provides the material from which all other interpretive acts develop. Critically, this theme also 
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highlights the centrality of deception to the story as first father and then son avoid detection and 
evade interpretation at the level of the story. We see this especially in the story’s central event, 
the son’s murder of his father. While this murder could be viewed as predominantly oedipal, the 
decapitation in “Gaza” is basically a semiotic act that obscures deciphering the headless form. 
Thus, the body itself becomes a crucial site to decode reality. There is no surface in “Gaza” that 
is free from such content that demands to be interpreted and understood. 
After the father’s decapitation, the king in the story must resort to a series of elaborate 
ploys to identify his accomplice. With this, the son’s deception of the king assumes increasing 
prominence. When only the headless corpse of the knight is discovered, the king orders the 
father’s decapitated body to be dragged through the streets so that the king’s knights can observe 
which household grieves for the dead man. In effect, the king stages an experiment to probe 
reality. The first time, the son cuts off his finger to excuse his weeping. The second, he drowns 
his own son in a well. Each time, the thief is brought before the king but manages to excuse his 
grief. Attempting one last stratagem, the king hangs the mutilated corpse upside down from a 
tree and guards it with forty knights. Through an ingenious device, however, the son rescues his 
father’s body. The tale thus foregrounds the son’s trickster ability to avoid detection and foil the 
king’s attempts to decode reality.  
A peculiar thing happens, though: not only is the king deceived, but the son is himself 
deceived by the illusion that he has created. After the second dragging and the drowning of his 
own son in the well, the thief again deceives the king – this time to the point where the son’s 
pretense itself begins to fold back into reality:  
Tunc etiam lacrimis falsis, immo uerissimis perfusus: Magnum, ait, o rex, beneficium 
solatiumque prestiteris misero, si me ab hac uita que omni tormento, omni morte michi 
grauior uidetur, subtraxeris. (54-55) 
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Then bathed with false tears, or rather with the very realest ones: You would offer me – a 
wretch – a great kindness and solace, O king, he said, if you subtracted me from this life 
which seems to me more painful than any torment, any death.1  
 
The thief has established such an elaborate pretense that reality has become indistinguishable 
from the fiction he has created – his tears both false and real. He has deceived not only the king, 
but, in a manner, himself. What began as mere profligacy has led to tragedy, with every added 
deception only compounding his suffering. This episode hints at the precariousness of the 
distinction between reality and fiction, including the reciprocal power of one to determine the 
other.  
Even so, the king is again deceived (“Sic iterum rex deceptus,” 55), as are the forty 
knights who are commanded to guard the corpse – confused (“confusi,” ibid.) by the thief’s 
cunning. The language of this final episode reinforces this sense of constant trickery, in which by 
a subtle device the son forges a divided [white and black] set of armor (“[s]ubtili ergo ingenio 
arma partita fabricat”) to delude (“deluderet”) and deceive (“deciperet”) the knights stationed on 
either side (ibid.). With the knights and the thief’s armor, the story presents a reality that is 
literally divided. The story thus ends as it began: with deception. The king remains misled. The 
tale provides no solution to its epistemic instability, as the thief manages to evade detection. 
“Gaza” thus raises the question of how to resolve this confusion. Here enters an 
important figure who is not present in other versions of the story: the king’s counselor, who 
plays the role of a kind of medieval detective figure. When the king has discovered his initial 
loss, he turns to an old man for assistance in catching the remaining thief. This figure provides 
key clues for the process of interpretation that the story demands: 
 
1 For the purposes of close reading in this essay, I have chosen to offer my own translations of the text. A published 
translation by Gilleland also exists and can be found in the bibliography.  
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Fuerat hic senex aliquando famosissimus latro quem comprehensum ex oculis priuauerat 
eique de mensa sua cotidianos constituerat cibos. Hic regi consilium sepe bonum et utile 
prebebat, utpote qui multa uiderat et audierat suoque experimento didicerat multa. (51) 
 
This old man was once a very famous thief that [the king] had caught and deprived of his 
eyes, whom the king had given a seat at his table for his daily meals. This man often gave 
good and useful advice, in as much as he was one who had seen and heard many things 
and had learned many things by his own experience. 
 
The old man (senex) is a sage in his own right who embodies the virtues of wisdom, experience, 
and expert counsel. Intrinsic to his story is a redemption in which his sins become the source of 
his insight. For this reason, he is described by the sage throughout not as “latro” (thief), but as 
“senex” (old man). A kind of Tiresias, he has lost his outward vision but gained an inward sight. 
Significantly, it is the knight’s son who is instead described throughout as “latro” in place of the 
old man. This is typical of frame tales more generally, where a resemblance to traditional tales 
leaves most characters unnamed and instead identifies them by a characteristic or profession 
(Irwin 42-43). This aspect of “Gaza” foregrounds the role of action in determining one’s 
character while alluding to the transformative power of wisdom to change it.  
Throughout the tale, the old man acts as a foil for his knightly counterpart’s failure of 
experience to offer wisdom and thus prevent his catastrophic downfall. In this way, not only does 
the old man serve as a foil for the knight’s well-meaning foolishness, but also stresses the 
necessity for Dolopathos (another senex) to listen to his counselors (i.e., the sages) in the frame 
narrative. It is therefore the old man who instructs the king how to determine where the thieves 
entered the tower (51), dissemble his grief at the loss of his wealth (51), lay the trap (51), drag 
the knight’s body through the streets once (53) and then twice (54), and arrange the final 
stratagem with the knights (55). In fact, the king does not take a single action in the tale that does 
not arise from the old man’s counsel. The fact that these devices fail does not diminish from their 
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significance to the telling, which does not amount to a single prescription but to a broader pattern 
of connections: experience over innocence, wisdom over folly, and deliberate counsel over 
precipitous action. In a word, the old man becomes the key interpreter within the tale, mirroring 
both the sage-as-narrator at the level of the frame as well as the external reader.   
One episode in particular elucidates this point. After the old man instructs the king to seal 
the tower and light a bundle of grass within, then to walk around the outside of the tower until he 
discovers the hole where the smoke escapes, the old man observes: 
Scias… o rex, fures tibi tuos per locum ubi fumus egreditur abstulisse thesauros; quos 
nisi aliqua arte capias, quod superest asportabunt. Non enim cessabunt, quippe quibus 
adhuc prospere cessit res, donec totum thesaurum exhauriant. (51) 
 
You may know, O king, that the thieves have carried off your treasure from you through 
the place where the smoke goes out; whom unless you capture by some device, they will 
carry off whatever remains. As long as they prosper in this, they will surely not stop until 
they have exhausted all the treasure. 
 
Here again is an instance of both pragmatic and philosophical significance. While the old man 
correctly interprets the tower as a practical object, the story also presents it as a broader symbol 
of vision and power. The tower symbolizes fears common to both story and frame narrative: the 
king in the story, who has lost a great portion of his wealth; the retired knight, who fears for his 
son’s reputation without an inheritance; and Dolopathos in the frame narrative, who believes he 
has been betrayed by his only son and must execute his heir. The tower thus serves as a nexus in 
a network of associations that establishes specular (i.e., mirror-like) reflections between story 
and frame. Further, it is the old man (the interpreter at the level of the story) that facilitates this 
process of decoding, who does so not with his senses but through reason.  
“Gaza” also highlights the consequences of errors in interpretation, which primarily take 
the form of the knight’s senescence and his failure to manage his son’s inheritance. The narration 
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begins to emphasize the pitiable quality of the knight as father and son fall into the trap laid for 
them by the king, which infuses the remainder of the story with pathos. Consistent with the 
sage’s manner of narration, there is a proverbial quality to the telling of this key moment: “Ecce 
autem fatalis illa dies, que neminem bonum malumue preterit” (But behold that fated/fatal day, 
which passes by no one good or ill, 52). Here the description of this day as “fatalis” (meaning 
both “deadly” as well as “destined” as decreed by the fates) underscores that no other end can 
come of such a course of action. Described as unfortunate and unsuspecting (“incautus miser,” a 
striking asyndeton), wearing his clothes and shoes, the father is submerged in the vat up to his 
chin. Only able to move his tongue, groaning (“[i]ngemiscens”) and wretched (“infelix”), he 
begs his son to decapitate him, lest he be identified by his head (“per caput cognitus”) and it 
bring eternal dishonor and loss to his lineage (“eternam suo generi maculam inferat et iacturam,” 
52). It is as disgraceful an end to a once honorable man as could be conceived, presaging Dante’s 
torments of the damned in the depths of hell.  
The sage’s description of the son’s decision here represents the key dichotomy in the 
Dolopathos and The Seven Sages – what Jaunzems has aptly described as “the difference 
between acts based upon knowledge and acts based upon ignorance, fear, and anger” (58). While 
the father’s actions thus far have been based upon love, they have been gravely misguided 
insofar as they have also stemmed from ignorance and fear. The sage outlines this distinction in 
his narration as the son hesitates to execute his father’s command to behead him, with “timor et 
necessitas” (fear and necessity) demanding what “amor” (love) forbids (52). The narrator 
describes the son’s dilemma as that of “not knowing what he should do more suited to the 
moment” (nesciens quid utilius ad tempus ageret, 52), which highlights above all the significance 
of interpretation in determining action, as well as the gravity of its results.  
 Johnson 10 
This pathos surrounding the knight continues in the narrator’s description of the treatment 
of the knight’s corpse. “Quia enim nobilis erat” (Because he was noble, 52), the old counselor 
observes when he hears of the knight’s decapitation. The past tense refers not only to the 
knight’s death, but to the consequences of errors of interpretation insofar as they determine 
moral choices – here, the loss of nobility. The knight’s son must then see his father dragged 
miserably (“Qui cum uideret patrem sic miserabiliter trahi,” 53) through the city at the old man’s 
advising. He must deny to the king that “hic miser truncus” (“this miserable trunk,” ibid.) has 
anything to do with him as he excuses his grief. Dragged twice through the surrounding cities, 
the father’s remains are thus described as a “corpse with its bones and muscles barely clinging 
together” ("cadauer… uix ossibus et neruis coherens," 54). The father’s corpse has become 
barely recognizable as a body. The original act of decapitation, predominantly a semiotic act, has 
continued to the point where it has become indecipherable. That the reader is here reminded of 
Hector only foregrounds the significance of that original folly. 
 
Level 2: The Frame Narrative 
Alta Silva provides the reader with a representative at this level in the same way that the sage 
offers Dolopathos representatives in the knight, king, and counselor within the story. This 
representative is Dolopathos himself, the king who listens to the sage’s story at the level of the 
frame narrative and thus fills the role designated by Gerald Prince as the “narratee.” Fulfilling all 
of Prince’s functions for the narratee, Dolopathos serves above all as a relay between diegetic 
narrator and external reader and thus plays a crucial part in determining what Prince might 
identify as the “narrative’s fundamental thrust” (Prince 20-23). Dolopathos’s role as the narratee 
determines the stakes of the narration: through his eventual decision, the sage’s story here and 
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those that follow will determine the life of Lucinius. Given that Prince’s narratee can be either a 
reader or a listener, the narratee in a frame narrative also acts as a mediator between Donald R. 
Howard’s conception of the “bookness” and the “voiceness” of a framed collection (applied to 
The Canterbury Tales in Howard’s analysis), the combination of which creates a new kind of 
work generative of untold meanings where the “commonplace… that you can read the world, 
nature, memory, or experience like a book” becomes “the notion… that you can read a book as 
you experience the world” (Howard 63-67). Dolopathos as narratee bridges these two aspects in 
the Dolopathos and contributes to the reader’s capacity to experience the text both aurally (in the 
manner of an oral tradition) and visually (as reader), playing a fundamental role in the text’s 
generation of “untold meanings.” 
 The first thing to notice about the metadiegetic staging of “Gaza” within the frame 
narrative is that it arrives without any ado. As is consistent with the rest of the collection, the 
sage does not preface his story: “tributum quod ceteris regibus soluere teneor tibi soluam: 
narrabo quod quondam accidit, si iubeas me audiri” (“I shall pay you the tribute that I have paid 
to other kings: I will tell you what happened once, if you command that I be heard,” 49). This 
approach typifies the sage’s storytelling technique at the level of the frame narrative, where the 
point is not to make exact identifications between the characters in the stories and those in the 
frame, but instead to make larger allegorical points that leave room for interpretation on behalf of 
the narratee. The sage does not imply that he intends his story to achieve a particular aim, but 
merely proclaims he will tell the story of “what happened once” and leaves any further 
conclusions to his hearer. This approach conflicts with other early versions of The Seven Sages, 
in which narrators offer lengthier prefaces that dictate static correspondences between characters 
in the tale and characters in the frame narrative, with neat conclusions appended to the end of 
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each story based upon these exact identifications. In contrast, the allegorical mode of telling used 
by the narrators within the frame narrative of “Gaza” and other stories in the Dolopathos allows 
for broader conclusions that honor the multifarious nature of the stories themselves, from which 
no single conclusion can be drawn.  
While the Dolopathos is not an allegorical work in terms of genre, Alta Silva draws upon 
allegorical techniques in a way that other contemporaneous versions of The Seven Sages do not. 
More common in religious and philosophical writings, medieval allegory offered access to a 
“non-sensible reality” and served as a “heuristic device that makes the difficult and abstract 
message easier to understand” – in essence, providing access to lessons beyond the capacity of 
“the literal language of logic and argument” to comprehend (Sweeney). Along with the 
flexibility in association between objects and ideas provided by allegory, this attempt to discern a 
reality that lies beyond the senses defines the process of interpretation in “Gaza.” (It is with this 
in mind that the old counselor’s blindness in “Gaza” assumes its full significance, as he 
possesses direct access to this non-sensible reality.) With its varying levels of interpretation, 
allegory serves as a parallel structure for the three sites of interpretation within “Gaza.” The 
sage’s allegorical mode thus provides a more flexible kind of storytelling that makes connections 
between the story and the frame narrative that would not otherwise be apparent. It also 
contributes to the creation of a type of narrative that possesses many of the characteristics of 
Bakhtin’s notion of the “dialogic” in a polyphonic text where there exists no master narrative 
under which all events can be interpreted or subsumed, and where narrative processes of 
coexistence, interaction, juxtaposition, and counterpoint simultaneously create layers of meaning 
based not upon their relative supremacy but upon the interrelationships that exist between them 
as perceived at a single point in time (Bakhtin 23). There further remains the possibility that 
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these tensions cannot be resolved (71), with the text’s most unifying quality being the 
“unmergedness” of the “plurality of independent and unmerged voices and consciousnesses and 
the genuine polyphony of full-valued voices” that it contains (4). So too in Alta Silva’s art, “it is 
futile to seek in it a systematic monological philosophical finalizedness, even of a dialectical 
nature, not because the author failed to achieve it, but because it was not a part of his intention” 
(26). This method of narration engages readers of “Gaza” by summoning them to an active role 
in the interpretation of this complexity. 
This is the extension of Jaunzems’ comment about The Seven Sages more generally that 
“the author’s interest lay in the parabolic possibilities of narrative rather than in the exemplary,” 
citing the difference that “both offer ethical advice but a parable demands an emotional 
commitment whereas an exemplum requires an intellectual assent” (55). Surpassing the merely 
moralizing quality of an exemplum, this emotional commitment seems to relate to the 
circumstances of the narration itself, one that is common to frame tales – what Irwin calls the 
“competition against a nearly impossible standard of excellence” (in this case, the standard is 
Dolopathos’s decree upon the life of Lucinius). Through this method of “empathetic narration,” 
the narrator (here, the sage) seeks to inspire a sense of empathy in his audience, Dolopathos (47). 
Interestingly, this appeal to empathy contrasts with the perspective on the emotions seen at the 
level of the story, where it is emotion (the father’s love, the son’s fear) that leads to tragedy in 
contrast to the more reasoned behavior of the old man. Emotion thus possesses different valences 
at different narrative levels. At the level of the external reader, this emotional commitment 
encourages the reader’s own empathetic response and invites a dynamic mode of engagement 
with the text. 
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It is also in this light that we understand the importance of the education of Lucinius at 
the start of the frame narrative and the prominence given to his learning to read, whereby the 
“concrete fact of knowing how to read carries with it the more symbolic aspect of knowing how 
to ‘read’ correctly the truth of the world around and the truth of the words of others,” which 
Simons (rightly) identifies as “the whole thrust of the Seven Sages tradition” (45-47). This theme 
corroborates the specularity of the frame narrative with its stories and fulfills a vital narrative 
function by providing the reader with the context to understand the interpolated stories. In this 
way, the reader observes that the work of the Dolopathos will revolve around how characters 
interpret stories in their role as exempla of reality versus fiction, with the fact of reading 
becoming an illustration of the possibility for the interpretation of signs and symbols. 
This specularity between story and frame begins immediately with the narrator’s 
description of the knight at the beginning of “Gaza:” 
… cum iam multis annis euolutis labore et senio fractus esset nec posset iam tumultum 
curamque curie sustinere, regem obnixe rogabat quatenus sue deinceps debilitati 
senectutique parcens claues sui thesauri reciperet eumque sineret ad propriam redire 
domum liceretque ei inter filios reliqum uite sue tempus quietum ducere et iocundum. 
(32) 
 
… since now, with many years having passed, he was broken by toil and old age, nor was 
he now able to bear the tumult and the cares of the court, he was determinedly asking the 
king to spare his weakness and senescence and take back the keys to the treasury, and to 
allow him to return to his own home and permit him to spend his remaining years among 
his children in peace and pleasure.  
 
This initial situation in the story mirrors exactly the circumstances in the frame, with the knight’s 
senescence mirroring that of Dolopathos who has reigned for many years and now wishes his son 
to assume the throne. The language the sage uses to describe the knight’s decrepitude echoes 
how Dolopathos described his own condition to Lucinius at the moment when he reveals his 
intention to entrust his kingdom to his son:  
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Et ecce iam labore et senio fractus sum, spiritus meus attenuatus est, defecit virtus mea, 
fortitudo recessit, subintravit corpus debilitas, tremor membra occupavit nichilque michi 
aliud superesse video quam sepulchrum. (49) 
 
And behold I am now broken by toil and old age, my spirit is weak, my strength has 
failed, my fortitude has receded, weakness has penetrated my body, trembling has 
occupied my limbs and I see that nothing else now remains for me except the tomb. 
 
Nevertheless, whereas contemporaneous versions of The Seven Sages would preserve such an 
identification throughout the entirety of the story and its interpretation, the specularity here will 
not preclude further correspondences.  
That the dissipated son in “Gaza” is the knight’s first-born son and heir (“primogenitus,” 
49) establishes a further symmetry between knight-son in the story and Dolopathos-Lucinius in 
the frame narrative. Significantly, this parable of the prodigal son contrasts with almost all other 
versions of The Seven Sages, where the guardian of the treasury is not a loyal knight as here but 
is instead a debauched sage whose own profligacy compels his thievery and the coercion of his 
son as an accomplice. (Told instead by the stepmother-empress, the lesson is that neither sages 
nor sons can be trusted.) Given the context in the frame narrative where Lucinius awaits 
execution for his own alleged intemperance, it seems strange for the author to devise another 
version where the sage instead tells the story and puts the son at fault for the vices that occasion 
his father’s death. Beyond this, the story could be understood to imply that Dolopathos ought to 
complete his son’s decreed execution rather than let his son squander his inheritance. 
Nevertheless, a rare line of interpretation interspersed by the sage within the story at this point (a 
sudden intrusion from another narrative level that Genette calls “metalepsis” (234)) explains the 
meaning of this change: “Hic non, o rex, a uirtute sperabat gloriam, qui eam pecuniis vel furtis 
putauerat obtinere” (“He [the son] was not hoping for glory from virtue, O king, who thought to 
get it by money or tricks,” 50). The sage’s intention is not to wag his finger at one specific 
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action, but to offer a subtler portrayal of the process of moral decision-making. The knight’s 
decisions in the story are clearly lacking, yet we have sympathy for him as a father who has 
failed. His actions are not condemned but held out to Dolopathos as a symbol of flawed 
humanity – albeit one neither the reader nor Dolopathos should wish to emulate.  
A key instance of deeper philosophical implications in “Gaza” comes with the sage’s 
interpretation of the thief’s deception of the king in the story. As with his resolution to decapitate 
his father in the tower, it is “ex metu et necessitate audaciam sumens” (“[by] taking up audacity 
from fear and necessity,” 53) that the son first escapes detection by telling the king he lost his 
thumb. Deceived, the king consoles him and bids him go in peace:  
Sic ergo ille astucia sua se suosque liberans ad propria remeauit, et rex similitudine 
delusus veritatis redit ad senem consilium accepturus. (54) 
 
Thus, freeing himself and his family by his cunning, he returned home. The king was 
deluded by the likeness of truth and returned to the old man to obtain counsel. 
 
The sage enjoins Dolopathos not to be deceived by the veil of ignorance that hangs between 
humanity and the reality of things, of which humanity sees only a semblance. These words apply 
directly to the frame narrative, where the queen has concocted an elaborate display to accuse 
Lucinius of a crime he has not committed. The judge of whether this is likeness or truth is 
Dolopathos, who must choose whom to condemn. To accomplish this, he must look beyond 
likeness, not allowing himself to be deceived by trickery as was the king in the tale.  
Despite the work that has been done so far, however, we are left with the question of how 
to conceptualize the reader’s place in this method of narration. Uncharacteristically, especially 
for a parable intended to inspire a particular conclusion, there is no protagonist or hero in the tale 
with whom the reader can fully identify. While impressive for the sheer ruthlessness of their 
cunning, the son’s actions are monstrous. The knight, first described as honorable and loyal, is 
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misled by a father’s love and succumbs to a grotesque death. The old counselor, while a complex 
and intriguing presence in the story, is ultimately outwitted by the young thief. The king too is 
deceived and despairs of finding redress. None of these characters provides a sure point of 
identification either for the external reader or for Dolopathos as proxy within the frame.  
Fascinatingly, the sage has employed a tale that evokes the oedipal fears of Dolopathos to 
make the exact opposite point from what could be inferred: let your son live. That this oedipal 
undercurrent echoes the frame drama need hardly be noted. But it is far from the only thing the 
reader is meant to notice. In fact, the meaning of the tale only begins to take form when we 
consider it in relation to our own act of reading. The mutability of correspondences, the sage’s 
refusal to draw exact conclusions from the events of his tale or establish fixed points of 
identification, his insistence on more subterranean meanings, and his demand for intervention on 
the part of the narratee in the frame and thus by necessity of the reader in the narratee’s place: 
this is itself the substance of his story.  
 
Text to Reader: The Extradiegetic 
Although I have chosen to exclude the extradiegetic as a site of interpretation in its own right 
within this essay, Alta Silva’s preface to the Dolopathos (located at Genette’s extradiegetic level) 
provides readers with indispensable information for understanding the intention of the work and 
their own process of interpretation. In this way, the extradiegetic serves as a transition from the 
sites of interpretation located within the text to the extratextual site of interpretation at the level 
of the reader.  
In his preface, Alta Silva describes the efforts of the ancient philosophers as engaged in 
“describing the truth and quality of things” (“rerum veritatem proprietatemque… disquierere,” 
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2), whence they left a “faithful record of history for the instruction and delight of posterity” 
(“rerum gestarum fidem et temporum noticiam in exemplum et in admiracionem posteris 
relinquentes,” ibid.). Excoriating contemporary authors for corrupting this “pure and simple truth 
with the ferment of lies” (fermento mendatii meram ac simplicem ipsam corrumpere ueritatem”) 
and “concealing lies with the cloak of truth” (“ueritatis pallio mendatium obumbrare”), Alta 
Silva describes them as offering praise and blame without either rhyme or reason, while 
forgetting Horace’s “medium tenere” (i.e., the “golden mean”) (ibid.). The only good thing about 
these pseudo-philosophers who rant and join together opposites in tales filled with monsters and 
ghouls, Alta Silva argues, is that their presentation of the laws and justice (“leges et iura”) and 
the “customs and deeds of corrupt and good men” (“prauorum bonorumque mores et actus”) “has 
left to the judgement of posterity what ought to be upheld and what should be rejected” (3). 
It is at this point that Alta Silva begins to introduce the frame narrative, leaving no further 
indication for how to interpret the collection. Nor does the author reenter until the final pages of 
the collection, after all the stories have been told. Having positioned himself against other 
authors of the day and offered preliminary guidance for how his own collection is to be 
understood, he surrenders the task of interpretation to the reader. It is therefore left to the reader 
to discern the “pure and simple truth” (“veritas”) from the lie (“mendatium”) that has been 
covered over by the “cloak of truth,” as the sage’s narration also describes in “Gaza.” It is the 
task of the reader to choose the good from the bad (“quid eligendum quidue respuendem foret,” 
3). Notably, Alta Silva softens the didactic aspect of the work by stating that it is intended both 
for instruction and for delight (“in exemplum et in admiracionem”). This implies that together 
with the pleasure of the stories themselves, the delight of the Dolopathos lies in one’s 
engagement with the model (“exemplum”) it provides, through which readers may learn 
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something about the nature of things through a positive mode of engagement with the text that 
arises from the pleasure of discovery and careful inquiry.  
 
Level 3: The Reader 
Along with these considerations from Alta Silva’s preface, it is the persistent uncertainty “Gaza” 
presents at the sites of interpretation within both the story and the frame narrative that determines 
the importance of the reader’s role. In a word, the sites of interpretation at the levels of story and 
frame invite the reader’s involvement in their own act of interpretation. This process is 
homologous to Iser’s conception of the “implied reader,” a construct inherent to any literary 
work whereby the text “designates a network of response-inviting structures, which impel the 
reader to grasp the text” and thus define the reader’s role (The Act of Reading 34). Iser’s implied 
reader further depends on two interrelated aspects, which Iser calls “the reader’s role as a textual 
structure” and “the reader’s role as a structured act.” The reader’s role as “textual structure” 
designates the process by which the reader comes “to occupy shifting vantage points [narrator, 
characters, plot, and fictitious reader] … and to fit the diverse perspectives into a gradually 
evolving pattern.” As the reader’s role is defined not just by the different perspectives within the 
text but also by “the vantage point from which he joins them together” and “the meeting place 
where they converge” (both of which only emerge through the reading process and therefore do 
not exist on the page), this process “allows [the reader] to grasp both the different starting points 
of the textual perspectives and their ultimate coalescence, which is guided by the interplay 
between the changing perspectives and the gradually unfolding coalescence itself” (35-36). 
Through this process, the author manipulates these perspectives to modify the reader’s 
relationship to the text (36). Although Iser worked with the novel, it is clear that the multilayered 
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structure inherent to a frame tale only amplifies the dynamic process through which a reader 
engages with the text. 
Thus far in this essay we have considered the reader’s role as a textual structure, which is 
defined in “Gaza” through the shifting perspectives at the level of the story and its relationship to 
other perspectives at the level of the frame narrative. We have also observed Alta Silva’s direct 
address to the reader at the extradiegetic level, by which the author has further specified the 
reader’s role. This textual structure facilitates the second aspect of Iser’s conception of reading, 
which he calls the “structured act” (The Act of Reading 36). By means of this latter process, the 
reader causes the various perspectives engendered by the text to converge within their 
imagination, with the two aspects of the implied reader thereby related as intention to fulfillment. 
Critically, “[t]he fact that the reader’s role can be fulfilled in different ways, according to 
historical or individual circumstances, is an indication that the structure of the text allows for 
different ways of fulfillment” (36-37). This explains why any given reader can actualize only a 
selective portion of the text’s possibilities. 
 The reader embarks upon the formal process of interpretation alongside the sage himself, 
who concludes his telling with a brief exegesis intended to persuade Dolopathos to delay the 
execution of his son:  
Vides, o rex, quotiens et qualiter rex iste deceptus sit. Tantis enim ignorantie tenebris 
mundus iste obuoluitur, ut sepe que iniquissima et falsissima sunt, iustissima et uerissima 
ab hominibus iudicentur. Tu ergo noli nimis properare perdere filium, quia forte latet 
quedam veritas que te ab obprobrio et filium tuum a morte ualeat liberare. Ego etiam rogo 
te quatinus pro exemplo quod tibi protuli vitam filio hodiernam concedas, crastina die, 
nisi melior superuenerit fortuna, facturus quod hodie omisisti. At rex: Certe, ait, o 
uenerande sapiens, magnis si hoc petisses honoribus a me ditandus fueras sed quoniam 
uitam tantum hodiernam filio postulasti, nephas duco tibi hoc denegare. (56) 
 
You see, O king, how often and in what way that king was deceived. By so great a 
darkness of ignorance is the world covered over, that often those things that are most 
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unjust and false are judged by men to be most just and true. You, then, do not so hurry to 
kill your son, because by chance some truth lies hidden that could free you from shame 
and your son from death. I likewise ask that you spare your son’s life for today in 
exchange for the story (exemplum) that I have offered you. Tomorrow, unless a better 
fortune has supervened, you may do what you omitted to do today. To which the king 
replied: Certainly, O venerable sage, you would have received great honors, had you 
asked for that. But since you have only asked one day of life for my son, I consider it 
impiety to deny this to you.  
 
While the sage’s skilled interpretation deserves an analysis unto itself, there are a few key points 
to note. First, the sage foregrounds the deception practiced against the king in the story, drawing 
further attention both to its magnitude and quality through the alliteration of “quotiens et 
qualiter” (how often and in what way). Importantly, he also uses the rhetorical “you see” 
(“[v]ides”) to coopt Dolopathos into the work of interpretation and thereby request the reader’s 
participation via Dolopathos’s role as narratee.  
Echoing Alta Silva’s preface at the extradiegetic level, the sage next states that the king’s 
confusion in the story merely reflects a universal problem of interpretation, where the 
conspicuous superlatives that follow emphasize the degree of humanity’s inability to discern true 
from false. The sage’s words here echo what Naithani has inferred as the moral of the closely 
related Arabian Nights: amidst the contradictions of human nature (itself a mirror of the larger 
nature that surrounds and creates it), “[t]he subject of these contradictions can neither judge nor 
be judged on any absolute scale.” We observe this critical element in the silence of Lucinius and 
his reliance on the sages to provide his defense. According to Naithani, knowledge thus means 
“the realization of mystery, deeds never have only a singular effect, beliefs stand to be corrected, 
and emotions need to be accompanied by compassion for the mystery” (279). This recognition of 
insufficiency in the face of epistemic and even ontological uncertainty is the lesson of “Gaza” 
and indeed of the entire Dolopathos. 
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Moving from the general to the specific, the sage uses “liberare” (to save, free) to act 
upon both the king and his son to raise the possibility that there is something that could save both 
the king from shame (“obprobio”) and his son (“filium tuum”) from death. Making the death of 
Lucinius equivalent to the disgrace of Dolopathos and father and son equivalent to one another, 
the sage places them on the same side of a rhetorical argument. All of this meanwhile proceeds 
against the concept that the sage has just introduced, “veritas” (truth), which is set against the 
world’s ignorance that the story exemplifies. At every level of “Gaza,” it is this possibility that 
there exists “some truth” (“quedam veritas”), itself as indistinct as the darkness of ignorance to 
which it is opposed (another recognition of the “mystery” described by Naithani), that is held out 
as the reward of careful inquiry. 
“Pro exemplo quod tibi protuli” (“in exchange for the story I have offered you”) further 
creates an equivalence between the story and the life of Lucinius. It is a straightforward equation: 
a story for a life. This calculation emphasizes the importance of the sage’s story at the same time 
that it gestures to the preciousness and fragility of a human life. The word he chooses to 
designate his story (“exemplum”) is likewise significant. Literally meaning “example,” it would 
have been familiar to medieval readers, who would have associated it with sermons and 
compendia of moral tales intended to instill virtue. With this, the sage stresses that there is a 
moral lesson embedded within his tale that has the force of religious instruction behind it. The 
sage further emphasizes that he requests only “vitam… hodiernam” (“today’s life,” or “the life of 
today”) for Lucinius. This is what Tarek El-Ariss has described as “holding time” in his work on 
the “aesthetics of survival,” in which the storyteller repeatedly defers a seemingly “inalterable 
retribution” and thereby creates a “terrifying space of vulnerability” akin to Bergson’s reading of 
“la durée” and Deleuze’s model of “the virtual” – spaces of becoming and suspension that exist 
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outside of time. The sage in this conception would be related to the archetypal trickster who 
manages to avoid reckoning – only up to a point, as Oedipus; or indefinitely, as Scheherazade 
and the sages on behalf of Lucinius here (El-Ariss 2-4). This proposed exchange thus 
demonstrates the provisional nature of truth as well as life – a conception of reality that is always 
relative, evolving, and contingent. This fact makes it possible for the reader to intervene, as any 
fixed arrival would abolish the reader’s role as an interlocutor. 
Thus, even with Dolopathos having accepted this exchange in his response, at this point 
the threat of death still looms over Lucinius. The epistemic uncertainty at the heart of the frame 
narrative generated by the stepmother’s false accusation of rape against Lucinius remains 
unresolved. Set within the frame narrative, this incident has provided occasion for a story 
(“Gaza”) that revolves around the search for truth and the ability of the characters to interpret 
their surroundings and navigate uncertainties in a way that foregrounds their ability to make 
moral choices. At the level of the frame narrative, the sage’s story has offered Dolopathos this 
same opportunity for careful interpretation and moral decision-making. While the drama of the 
frame narrative will eventually be neatly resolved with the exoneration of Lucinius and the 
execution of the queen, it is at this point of suspension that the reader’s intervention occurs. In 
this way, Dolopathos’s admission that it would be “nephas” (meaning not simply “wrong,” but 
an “impiety” or violation of divine law) not to grant the sage’s request to defer his son’s death 
serves as a direct injunction from the text to the reader, part of Iser’s “textual structure” by which 
Alta Silva reminds readers that they have as much at stake in the act of interpretation as do the 
characters on the page.  
It thus falls to the reader to respond to this uncertainty through their own act of reading. 
As such, it is significant that the reader is present for the sage’s interpretation, as the sage models 
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the reader’s own process through the importance he gives to deliberate analysis, the ability to 
read and speak critically, and the recognition of the contradictions inherent to experience and the 
mystery of reality. Yet there always exists a space between the stories as they are told and 
interpreted at the level of the frame and the external reader. Readers witness not just a useful, 
moral story with a vague or general application to their own lives: it is something they are 
involved in, because they have been asked to participate. This relates closely to Jaunzems’s 
observation that “the didactic force” of The Seven Sages lies not in the content of the stories per 
se, but in the internal drama of the fact that “the reader’s superior knowledge forces him to meet 
in advance the ethical issues raised by the tales and then invites him to reflect upon the 
difference between acts based upon knowledge and acts based upon ignorance, fear, and anger” 
(58) – a distinction that “Gaza” has foregrounded at every narrative level.  
Further, these sites of interpretation at the levels of story, frame narrative, and reader are 
not just parallel, but superimposed. Viewed diachronically, events of successful or failed 
interpretation at the level of the story provide the material for later interpretation that will occur 
at higher levels of analysis. When viewed synchronically, however, there is no such separation. 
The reader simultaneously occupies all levels through their place in Iser’s “textual structure” and 
is intended to participate in every act of interpretation that occurs at each site within the story 
and the frame narrative in their role as “structured act.” The place of reading becomes the place 
of interpretation. Here again we see the text’s dialogic ability to overlay narrative levels and 
create meaning not through sequence but through interaction (Bakhtin 25-26). As in Iser’s 
transcendental vision of the literary work in which the twin poles of text and reader converge at a 
midpoint that cannot be identified “either with the reality of the text or with the individual 
disposition of the reader” but which nevertheless sets the text in motion and creates its existence 
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(“The Reading Process” 50), Alta Silva requires that the reader reach an independent conclusion 
that may conflict with that of the text itself and with those of other readers. This in turn relates to 
Iser’s conception of the text as the fixed stars among which different readers will find different 
constellations, no matter the influence that the author exerts on the processes of their connection 
(“The Reading Process” 57) – a result of the tension that exists between the real reader and their 
generic place as the “implied reader” generated by the text (The Act of Reading 36). Crucially, 
one reader’s interpretation will be not only different from another’s and from the text’s, but 
more. That is to say, the morals appended to the stories within the frame, as here, are only 
distillations or fragments of the text’s potentialities. Furthermore, the insufficiency of the text’s 
interpretation is itself deliberate: in the recognition of its inadequacy, the reader is tasked with its 
completion. This is the nature of the “unwritten” part of the text that Iser identifies as stimulating 
the reader’s engagement through an attempt to supply the missing links (“The Reading Process” 
51). This process by which the reader is drawn into both the tale and its telling – both the story 
and its interpretation – is the key element in the reader’s experience of “Gaza.”  
While I have chosen to designate the level of reader as a site of interpretation and not a 
fourth narrative level superimposed upon Genette’s previous three, the narrative structure of 
“Gaza” also generates the peculiar sense that the reader occupies a space where the boundaries of 
the text become coterminous with those of the external world. The reader thus seems to act as a 
character in the “real” world whose own success is no less dependent upon processes of 
interpretation than were those of the characters on the page. Genette identifies the genesis of this 
bizarre sensation in the effects of “metalepsis” through which one level of narrative intrudes 
upon another, the breaking of the “shifting but sacred frontier between two worlds, the world in 
which one tells, the world of which one tells” (236) – a dynamic inherent to the frame tale. “Such 
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inversions,” Genette cites from Borges, “suggest that if the characters in a story can be readers or 
spectators, then we, their readers or spectators, can be fictitious” (ibid.). This is the 
“unacceptable and insistent hypothesis” about metalepsis, Genette argues, which troubles the 
reader with the uncanny sense “that the extradiegetic is perhaps always diegetic, and that the 
narrator and his narratees – you and I – perhaps belong to some narrative” (ibid.). In this light, 
we might equally designate the external reader not simply as another site of interpretation, but 
another, supra-diegetic narrative level unto itself. This is perhaps the most profound and 
unsettling conclusion that “Gaza” and the frame tale more generally suggests to its readers. 
 
3. Conclusion 
Focusing on a single story in the Dolopathos, I have argued that The Seven Sages uniquely 
dramatizes the process of interpretation. “Gaza” shows the many implications of this narrative 
approach, and herein lies the nature of its didacticism. Whatever explicit moral one can draw 
from “Gaza” is only “pars pro toto,” wherein the richness of the text’s “semantic possibilities” 
will always lie beyond the capacity of the reader to integrate into a single consistent pattern (Iser, 
“The Reading Process” 60). The value of the Dolopathos lies in such a recognition. It accepts as 
axiomatic that true didacticism does not insist upon a single moral, but instead makes readers 
aware of how they read and interpret situations of epistemic and moral complexity. Real 
didacticism is therefore not any stated moral one could apply, Alta Silva argues, but an attitude 
that foregrounds interpretation in the storytelling process.  
While Alta Silva’s “Gaza” in the Dolopathos typifies the layeredness inherent to the 
interpretation of a dialogic narrative that operates at several levels simultaneously, the process it 
exemplifies is also an essential element shared throughout the corpus of The Seven Sages. The 
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Seven Sages presents a world in which storytelling becomes a condition of survival and thus 
assumes the quality of an existential necessity. In doing so, it places the burden of interpretation 
on readers, who must develop their own understanding and carry that understanding across the 
shifting boundaries of the text into the world beyond. That the Seven Sages refuses to provide 
final answers to the world’s mystery is ultimately its greatest lesson and the true nature of its 
didacticism.  
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